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Abstract: 
To date, pay-for-performance programs targeting the care of persons with chronic conditions have primarily 
been directed at physicians and provide an alternative to health plan-sponsored chronic disease management 
(DM) programs. Both approaches require similar infrastructure, and each has its own advantages and 
disadvantages for program implementation. Pay-for-performance programs use incentives based on patient out-
comes; however, an alternative system might incorporate measures of structure and process. Using a conceptual 
framework, the authors explore the variation in 50 diabetes DM programs using data from the 2002 National 
Business Coalition on Health’s eValue8 Request for Information (RFI). The authors raise issues relevant to the 
assignment of accountability for patient outcomes to either health plans or physicians. They analyze the 
association between RFI scores measuring structures and processes, and HEDIS diabetes intermediate outcome 
measures. Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of using the RFI scores as an alternative metric for pay-for-
performance programs are discussed. 
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Article: 
Despite substantial dollars spent on health care, shortcomings in quality and patient safety documented in the 
Institute of Medicine’s reports Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century 
(Institute of Medicine 2001) and To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System (Institute of Medicine 2000) 
suggest that purchasers are not receiving optimal returns for their investment. In response to this concern, pay-
for-performance (P4P), which rewards providers for delivering high-quality care, is becoming a widely 
discussed strategy for addressing these deficiencies (Ferman 2004; Rosenthal et al. 2004). While P4P strategies 
to date have targeted the treatment of both acute and chronic conditions, the prevalence and impact of the latter 
make a compelling argument for application to these diseases. Based on 1998 Medical Expenditure Panel data, 
it is estimated that while 45 percent of the population are afflicted with one or more chronic conditions, they 
account for 78 percent of health care spending (Anderson and Horvath 2004). Despite the substantial amount of 
resources expended on these diseases, McGlynn et al. (2003) found that adults receive, on average, only 56.1 
percent of the recommended care for their conditions. 
 
Prior to the emergence of P4P initiatives, health plans have been actively engaged in improvement efforts 
targeted at chronic care through the provision of disease management (DM) programs (Villagra 2004). DM is a 
population-based approach to the treatment of chronic illness using evidence-based clinical guidelines, 
multidisciplinary treatment approaches, and information systems to achieve good clinical outcomes at 
acceptable costs (Couch 1998). DM emphasizes the use of primary and secondary screening procedures, as well 
as prevention activities, to minimize the occurrence of costly and debilitating complications. Health plan–
sponsored DM programs and many P4P programs targeted at physicians such as the Bridges to Excellence 
(BTE 2005) Diabetes Care Performance Assessment Program share a similar goal, namely, better patient 
outcomes. Current indicators of patient outcomes for chronic conditions in DM and P4P are composed of 
patient care process and intermediate outcome indicators, such as the HEDIS Comprehensive Diabetes Care 
measures (National Committee for Quality Assurance 2003). Achievement of good HEDIS scores requires a 
combination of guideline-driven medical management by practitioners and self-management of the condition by 
the person with the disease (Wagner et al. 2001). A well-integrated DM program addresses both of these 
components. 
 
While physician P4P and health plan DM programs share similar objectives, the emergence of these two 
strategies raises interesting issues in terms of accountability, the flow of dollars, and the composition of the 
measurement systems used for assigning rewards. If P4P is going to be used as a strategy for motivating better 
chronic care, does it make more sense to target the incentives at health plans, physician groups, or a 
combination of the two? Since the management of a chronic condition requires significant effort on the part of 
individuals with the disease, should patients also be eligible for incentives? Current chronic care P4P programs 
use patient-level measures of intermediate outcomes and generally do not take into consideration the actual 
systems and practice changes undertaken by clinicians to achieve these results. It has been suggested that a 
broad-based measure of the structure and process of DM programs may be a better metric on which to base 
provider payments. 
 
One example of a broad-based measure of DM is the National Business Coalition on Health’s eValue8 RFI, 
which scores health plans on the degree to which they have implemented successful DM programs. The 
eValue8 measurement system incorporates a combination of outcome measures (e.g., HEDIS results) and 
measures of DM processes undertaken by the plans. However, there have been no formal attempts to validate 
the utility of the eValue8 instrument for distinguishing among health plan–sponsored DM programs or for 
helping physicians or payers to understand the components of DM programs that can help them to achieve the 
objectives of P4P programs. Thus, it is important to understand the link between P4P and DM from multiple 
perspectives and to examine empirical evidence regarding this relationship. 
 
NEW CONTRIBUTION 
This article makes three significant contributions. First, it discusses a conceptual framework for understanding 
the link between DM and P4P in the management of chronically ill patients. The model is examined from the 
perspective of stakeholders in the P4P movement, including physicians and other health care providers (e.g., 
nurse case managers, dieticians), private (e.g., employers) and public sector health care purchasers, and risk-
assuming health plans or non-risk-assuming third party administrators. Second, the article uses a unique data 
source to empirically assess the variation in managed care organization–sponsored DM programs, providing the 
first baseline information about the content and structure of DM programs across multiple organizations. For 
purposes of this article, we focus our analysis on the management of diabetes, although one could apply the 
same framework to other chronic illnesses. Third, the relationship between a broad-based measure of DM 
programs (e.g., the eValue8 RFI) and the currently used measures of patient ―outcomes‖ (i.e., the HEDIS 
Comprehensive Diabetes Care indicators) is examined empirically. This analysis is useful for considering 
whether broader or more narrowly focused measures of chronic illness care are desirable in P4P programs. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
To illustrate the relationship between DM and P4P in the context of the treatment of chronic conditions, we 
borrow from a model of a managed care organization–sponsored DM program (with modifications) developed 
by Beich (2005) depicted in Figure 1. Several sources of information were used to develop this model, 
including the Chronic Care Model (Wagner et al. 2001), the Disease Management Association of America 
(2002), DM accreditation standards from the National Committee for Quality Assurance (2001), URAC (2002) 
and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (2002), and the published and peer-
reviewed DM literature. 
 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, starting on the far right-hand side, the key objective of the DM process is to improve 
patient outcomes for persons with chronic conditions. As one moves left in the figure from the outcomes, the 
model identifies the key components and processes required to achieve these desired outcomes. Details are 
described elsewhere in Beich (2005), but patients with the condition (e.g., diabetes) must be identified, stratified 
based on illness severity, and tracked and managed appropriately. The primary objective of implementing the 
infrastructure depicted on the left side of this figure is to enable an optimal patient care process. Key 
characteristics of this process, as described in the Chronic Care Model (Wagner et al. 2001), include 
practitioners providing care consistent with clinical guidelines, preferably in multidisciplinary, collaborative 
teams, interacting with motivated patients, who take responsibility for self-management of their disease. 
 
In terms of P4P, while Figure 1 was originally developed to describe a health plan–sponsored DM program, the 
components and processes are applicable to other sponsors such as physician groups, employers, or public 
purchasers interested in improving chronic care management. While DM is often thought of as being provided 
through health plans, either directly or through a DM vendor, physician groups may be able to perform as good 
or better, providing that they have the necessary infrastructure. Employers and government payers can opt to 
configure incentive programs with health plans via their DM programs, or they may find it more advantageous 
to contract directly with physician groups. Health plans can also structure incentive programs for participating 
physician groups, delegating all or a portion of the DM process. Figure 1 also identifies DM program 
components that might be measured in the event that an alternative to the patient-level measures currently used 
in P4P programs is desired. 
 
P4P: STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES 
For public and private payers interested in improving the quality of care for their constituents with chronic 
conditions, two key issues emerge. First, who is the appropriate entity to be targeted for incentives—health 
plans, DM vendors, physicians, individuals with the disease, or a combination of the above? Second, should 
P4P rely on the commonly used patient-level ―outcome‖ indicators, or should these programs incorporate 
process and structure measures? From the perspective of health plans and third party administrators, one of the 
key challenges is how plans can optimally influence the patient care process when plans do not directly deliver 
health care. For physicians or physician groups subject to P4P, their primary challenge is to implement the 
required infrastructure and make the appropriate changes to the patient care process to achieve the best 
outcomes, but there is little evidence of the relationship between specific processes and outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
DATA 
The data for this study were collected by the National Business Coalition on Health as part of their eValue8 
Request for Information (RFI) project. The RFI is an annual survey issued to health plans providing coverage to 
coalition and individual employer members of the National Business Coalition on Health. It was developed with 
financial support and research expertise from the Centers for Disease Control and the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration. While the RFI covers a wide range of topics, several modules are 
devoted to DM for chronic conditions. Plan responses are scored by members of the coalition, and employers 
participating in this process use the results to facilitate value-based purchasing of health insurance coverage for 
their employees. Some employers, including the General Motors Corporation, factor the RFI scores in the 
establishment of employee health insurance copremium levels, with the higher scoring eValue8 plans being 
offered to employees at lower prices. While the primary goal of the survey is to provide comparative ratings for 
plans, another goal of the RFI is to establish a common set of purchaser expectations to motivate health plan 
quality improvement initiatives. 
 
Plan responses to the 2002 RFI Diabetes Management module were used for this study. While the purposive 
sample is not representative of the universe of health plans in the United States, it consists of plans with a wide 
range of locations, affiliations, enrollment, and tax status. From the perspective of validity, responses from each 
plan are reviewed by a member of the coalition, and health plans must provide documentation (i.e., attachments) 
to substantiate responses to key questions. Coalition members also communicate with plan representatives to 
clarify and resolve uncertainties. Once the information is confirmed, scoring is performed by coalition members 
using a predefined scoring algorithm. Data in this study include plan responses, coalition reviewer comments, 
and assigned scores for the diabetes module; attachments were not available for review. A small portion of the 
data consisted of narrative responses requiring coding and abstracting via content analysis (Neuendorf 2002). 
 
Two other data sources were employed including InterStudy Corporation’s MSA Profiler and Competitive Edge 
(calendar year 2001), which was used to describe managed care organization characteristics, and the National 
Committee for Quality Assurance’s HEDIS data (calendar years 2001 and 2002) used to assess diabetes care 
performance for plans in the RFI set. For this analysis, the six HEDIS Comprehensive Diabetes Care indicators 
(National Committee for Quality Assurance 2003), which are generally accepted measures of process and 
intermediate outcomes, were used. The indicators are as follows: glycated haemoglobin (HbA1c) testing 
(percentage with at least one HbA1c test in the current year), poor HbA1c control (percentage with HbA1c > 
9.0), eye exams (percentage with annual diabetic retinal eye exam), low-density lipoprotein (LDL) screening 
(percentage with annual LDL-C screening), LDL control (percentage with LDL < 130 mg/dl) and monitoring 
nephropathy (percentage with microalbuminuria test). All indicators are rates based on the percentage of 
members with diabetes. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHOD 
The method employed in this study was motivated by two research questions. First, what is the variation in the 
characteristics of managed care organization–sponsored DM programs targeted at diabetes? Second, is there a 
link between the eValue8 scores measuring DM program structures and processes and the outcomes achieved 
for chronically ill patients? The first question is assessed descriptively by examining statistics of frequency, 
measures of central tendency (mean), and measures of variation (standard deviation and coefficient of variation) 
for components of the DM model. In addition, agglomerated hierarchical cluster analysis (Everitt, Landau, and 
Leese 2001) was employed to identify patterns of response in the Member Interventions components. 
 
To address the second question, we assessed the relationship between the eValue8 process scores and 
commonly accepted ―outcome‖ measures for diabetes management by regressing the eValue8 2002 diabetes 
module process scores on each of the HEDIS Comprehensive Diabetes Care indicators, using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and logistic regression. The intent was to test the ability of the 2002 eValue8 process scores 
(pertaining to activities conducted in calendar year 2001) to predict the 2002 HEDIS (calendar year 2001) 
results, the 2003 HEDIS (calendar year 2002) results, and the change in HEDIS results from 2002 to 2003, 
within the sample. 
RESULTS 
HEALTH PLAN CHARACTERISTICS 
All 50 plans in the 2002 RFI database were health maintenance organizations (HMOs). The mean enrollment 
for commercial members was 405,857 (SD = 662,189), with a range of 8,105 to 2,794,895. Sixty percent were 
for-profit and the remaining 40 percent not-for profit plans. Health plan affiliation status is as follows: national 
managed care firms, 50 percent; Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 18 percent; and independent plans, 32 percent. Plans 
were distributed across the following regions of the country: Northeast, 18 percent; Southeast, 6 percent; 
Midwest, 52 percent; West, 14 percent; and Southwest, 10 percent. The large concentration of the midwestern 
health plan is a reflection of the active role of health care coalitions and purchaser members from this region. 
 
Finally, the distribution of plans and enrollment by model type is depicted in Table 1. Compared to 2002 
national HMO enrollment statistics (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004), the RFI sample is underrepresented in 
mixed and Independent Practice Association (IPA) models and overrepresented in network model plans. 
 
VARIATION IN DM PROGRAMS AS MEASURED BY RFI SCORES 
The RFI scoring system is derived from measures of DM program structures, processes, and outcomes, with a 
maximum total score of 100 points. Table 2 presents the results of the scores for the sample, broken out by the 
DM program components noted in Figure 1. The Quality Improvement Process section, accounting for a 
potential 37 points, consists entirely of outcome measures. Approximately half of these are composed of the 
previously described HEDIS diabetes measures. Since the intention of this article is to examine measures of the 
structure and process of DM programs as alternative measurements for DM P4P programs, our analysis focused 
on the structural and process components of the RFI. 
 
If a purchaser was to differentiate between competing programs, they would most likely start with the aggregate 
measure. The mean aggregate structure and process score for this sample is 32.5 points (SD = 16.3), or 51.6 
percent of the maximum possible score, with a range of 4 to 62.5 points and a coefficient of variation (CV) of 
50.1. These results strongly suggest wide variation in the implementation of DM structures and processes within 
plans in the sample. Also, assuming that 63 points represent an ideal score, they also indicate that, on average, 
plans are implementing just more than half of the structures and processes that the National Business Coalition 
on Health deems important for DM programs. 
 
 
A review of the individual component scores indicates similar patterns. Mean scores, expressed as a percentage 
of the maximum possible, range from a low of 45 percent for Practitioner Interventions to a high of 68 percent 
for Stratification. Using the coefficient of variation as the comparative metric, Patient Registry has the lowest 
variation with a CV of 42.86, and Practitioner Interventions have the highest with a CV of 80.87. On the 
surface, the variation in scores would indicate that the RFI scores provide a viable means of differentiating 
plans that would be amenable to P4P. However, to assess the validity of this approach, it is necessary to 
investigate details of the National Business Coalition on Health scoring system to assess if it measures the 
appropriate content and uses an appropriate metric. The remainder of this section will address scoring for each 
DM component, working from right to left in the model depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Member and Physician Interventions 
Member and practitioner interventions play a key role in the management of chronic conditions. In a DM 
program, they represent the means by which health plans attempt to improve the patient care process. The goal 
of member interventions is to motivate and facilitate self-management, a critical component of chronic care 
(Glasgow et al. 2002). Self-management occurs when patients are engaged in activities to promote health, 
adhere to treatment protocols, monitor their own physical and emotional status, and manage the impact of the 
disease on their life (Wagner, Austin, and Von Korff 1996). Given the significance of self-management, 
member interventions strategies should play a particularly important role both in differentiating between 
programs and also in deciding the most appropriate entity to provide the services. 
 
The Member Interventions component is scored primarily on the basis of a plan’s provision of the interventions 
noted in Table 3. Looking at intervention usage across all plans, one of the most interesting findings is that the 
most frequently provided intervention, printed educational materials, is generally not believed to be very 
effective at motivating self-management. Since plans typically provide multiple interventions, patterns were 
analyzed using cluster analysis (Everitt, Landau, and Leese 2001) to categorize plans into groups based on the 
types of interventions used. Interventions were classified as binary events (yes or no), and the simple matching 
coefficient was employed as the measure of similarity. Clustering was accomplished via the average linkage 
method, and the four-cluster solution was selected. Table 3 indicates the frequency of intervention use, the 
average number of interventions used, and the average intervention score for each cluster and across all plans. 
Plans in Cluster 1 were the most aggressive, using more interventions than the others. In contrast, plans in 
Cluster 2, the largest on average, provided less than half the number of interventions, primarily relying on 
printed materials and reminders for services. Cluster 3 differentiates itself by heavy reliance on electronic 
technologies including the telephone (inbound and outbound), and e-mail/Web. Finally, Cluster 4 is 
characterized by the total absence of interventions; however, since plans were only credited as providing an 
intervention based on provision of eligibility and participation data, this absence may be partially the result of 
their inability to submit the necessary documentation, but is still nonetheless informative, particularly for 
purchasers who compare and evaluate plans. 
 
 
On the positive side, the RFI assesses the most commonly used member interventions and assigns an 
appropriate relative weighting to each. However, given the importance of member interventions, the maximum 
availability of 19 points for this component is not sufficient. Realistically, it should be allocated 30 to 35 points. 
Perhaps most important from the purchaser’s perspective, the scoring system fails to capture differences in 
intervention content, the quality of delivery, and participation rates. Regarding the latter, while plans must 
provide eligibility and participation rates to receive credit, scores are assigned on the provision of the data rather 
than on the level of participation. Therefore, a plan providing an intervention to 5 percent of its eligible 
population receives the same score as one delivering it to 20 percent of its eligible population. Using this 
component score as a means for purchasers to differentiate programs might lead to erroneous conclusions since 
a plan providing multiple interventions with mediocre implementation and minimal participation would receive 
a higher score than a plan that delivers limited, but well-executed interventions to the majority of its members 
with the disease. 
 
From the perspective of the P4P issue of who should be incentivized, the provision of member interventions is a 
resource-intensive process. Successful strategies for facilitation of patient self-management require frequent and 
ongoing collaboration between practitioners and patients to elicit patient behavior change (Norris, Engelgau, 
and Narayan 2001). While the relative effectiveness of individual and specific combinations of interventions to 
motivate self-management has yet to be proven empirically, multifaceted interventions appear to be more 
effective than single interventions (Shojania et al. 2004). Time demands and training issues suggest that 
physicians may not be the best individuals to provide self-management training, and the process may be more 
effectively implemented through the use of nurses, dieticians, and other practitioners (Larme and Pugh 1998). 
This would suggest that optimal delivery of member interventions would be cost prohibitive for solo and small 
group practitioners and might be more appropriately provided by health plans. On the other hand, the 
introduction of the health plan as a third party in the patient care process presents communication and 
coordination issues that might impede collaboration. 
 
In the context of DM, practitioner interventions are actions taken to encourage and facilitate adherence to 
clinical guidelines. The Practitioner Interventions component scores are primarily determined by the plan’s 
provision of provider guideline adherence reports. Sixty-eight percent of plans reported that they provide 
diabetes guideline adherence reports to primary care physicians, comparing their performance to peers and/or 
benchmarks. The RFI scoring system differentiates plans based on the number of indicators reported, frequency 
of reports, inclusion of benchmarks, and categories of physicians receiving reports. There was variation in these 
report attributes among the plans in the sample; however, interpretation of this variation yields little in the way 
of practical information for differentiating plans. Even when the responses were analyzed with cluster analysis, 
no clear patterns emerged. What the scores fail to reveal is whether the physicians read the reports and whether 
they modify their practice patterns on the basis of the feedback. 
 
From the perspective of P4P, one of the interesting findings in this section is that 30 percent of the plans in the 
sample provided financial incentives to physicians for guideline adherence. While details of the incentive 
programs were not available, comments by the scorers suggest that most plans incorporate diabetes indicators 
along with other indicators in their compensation program, rather than providing a specific diabetes care bonus. 
It is also not feasible to determine if the dollars are sufficient to motivate behavior change. However, this raises 
interesting options for the use of P4P. Even if purchasers decided to incentivize health plans, rather than 
providers, plans may choose to implement their own P4P program for their provider network. 
 
For a purchaser, the results of the scores in the Practitioner Interventions component would probably not be that 
useful for either discriminating between programs or for use as a P4P metric. First, the section is overweighted 
at 31 points, which is almost one half of the RFI structure and process scores. While practitioner interventions 
are important, a more appropriate weight would be 15 to 20 points. Second, the section focuses too heavily on 
guideline reports at the expense of other interventions. In general, guideline adherence reports have been found 
to be one of the less effective interventions for motivating changes in physician behavior (Stone et al. 2002). 
 
Patient Registry, Stratification, and Evidence-Based Guidelines 
In a DM program, the patient registry captures key clinical and administrative data for members identified with 
the disease to enable tracking over time (Metzger 2004). The registry typically provides the information 
required for stratification and can also facilitate clinical decision making by highlighting needed or overdue 
services. The RFI scores for the Patient Registry component are primarily related to patient identification. To 
receive full credit for this component, a plan must identify at least 5 percent of its members as having diabetes. 
The mean prevalence of diabetes identified by the plans in the sample was 3.6 percent (SD =1.01 percent), with 
only 8 percent meeting the 5 percent threshold. Absent information on plan distribution of enrollee age and 
race/ethnic composition, it is not feasible to calculate precise expected prevalence rates. Nonetheless, based on 
the CDC’s (2004) estimates of national prevalence, plans in the sample appear to be significantly under-
identifying members with diabetes. 
 
The ability to identify persons with the disease may be an important factor in deciding who to hold accountable 
for chronic disease management. In order for plans to do this, they must rely either on claims, encounter, phar-
macy, and laboratory data or on referrals to the DM program from practitioners. Our findings suggest that plan 
systems for patient identification do not function that well. Practitioners are more likely to be aware of the 
patient’s condition as a result of ongoing encounters, access to the medical record, and diagnostic test results. 
However, compared to practitioners, a health plan is more likely to have the resources to implement a 
sophisticated registry system. 
 
Patient stratification is used to divide members with chronic conditions into categories based on severity and/or 
the probability of experiencing acute complications, and it is also used to prioritize interventions based on 
patient needs. RFI scoring for the Stratification component is contingent on the plan’s provision of data about 
the number of strata, the criteria used for stratum assignment, and the distribution of members among these 
categories. Major findings from the data are that 84 percent of the plans stratify their patients, and with the 
exception of standardized systems in plans affiliated with national managed care firms, they all do it very 
differently. Given the lack of published empirical data on the relative effectiveness of different approaches in 
the stratification process (Cousins, Shickle, and Bander 2002), it is not feasible to make definitive statements 
about the meaning of this variation. 
 
Evidence-based clinical guidelines are key to the DM process, providing the roadmap for the clinical 
management of persons with the disease (Weingarten and Graber 1998). Scoring of the Evidence-Based 
Guidelines component is contingent on the presence or absence of guidelines, participation in regional 
collaborative efforts to standardize guidelines among competing plans, and provision of education to physicians 
on guideline topics. Realistically, the last factor is more of a practitioner intervention than a guideline issue, 
complicating interpretation of the RFI’s components scores. 
 
The major findings related to the guideline component are that 98 percent of the plans had implemented 
diabetes guidelines, and 54 percent participated in some form of collaborative guideline effort. Since virtually 
all plans in the sample report guidelines in place, an indicator of their presence or absence does not provide a lot 
of information to distinguish program quality (except in the case of the one plan in the sample that reported not 
having formally adopted guidelines). Also, given the availability of diabetes guidelines, at no cost, from sources 
such as the American Diabetes Association (2003) and the Institute for Clinical Systems Improvement (2001), it 
is easy for even solo practitioners to obtain a copy for their practice. 
 
For the purchaser, a general observation of the scoring criteria for the Stratification, Patient Registry, and 
Evidence-Based Guidelines components is that the questions primarily target structures and do not get at the 
functionality of the processes. The ideal DM program would incorporate key guideline requirements into the 
registry system, use the registry information to feed the stratification process, and employ the registry and 
stratification information to facilitate decision support by practitioners (e.g., provision of reminders for needed 
services). While the RFI questions and scores related to these components may be effective at ruling out 
programs that do not have key structures (e.g., the plan without guidelines), the scores fail to provide 
information that discriminates a program’s ability to integrate these components into well-functioning 
programs. 
 
The final component, Program Philosophy and Objectives, is a miscellaneous category with scoring contingent 
on the cultural and linguistic appropriateness of services and the provision of innovative services. In general, 
plans performed well on the first topic, with a mean score of 83 percent of the maximum available points. The 
Innovations section allows for open-ended descriptions of unique aspects of programs not covered in other 
sections of the RFI. While 40 percent of the plans received full or partial credit for providing innovative 
services, descriptions were not available for review. In terms of plan discrimination, the scores in this section 
should be interpreted with caution since the assignment of scores for innovations is up to the judgment of the 
RFI scorers. 
 
The RFI scoring system provides a means of rank ordering plans on the basis of an assessment of DM structures 
and processes. While this system has the potential to be used as a P4P measurement device, its practical use is 
contingent on the validity of the metrics. One of the challenges facing DM is the lack of conclusive empirical 
studies indicating the factors that contribute to effective functioning of each component. For example, despite 
multiple studies, we still do not have a clear picture of the most effective intervention strategies for motivating 
changes in either physician or patient behavior (Shojania and Grimshaw 2005). Given the absence of good 
empirical data, the RFI scoring system was developed primarily through expert consensus. Ultimately, if the 
RFI structure and process scores are to be used to discriminate between plans, either for value-based purchasing 
or P4P, the scores should positively correlate with patient outcomes. In the next section, we assess this 
correlation. 
 
CORRELATION BETWEEN RFI STRUCTURE AND PROCESS SCORES AND HEDIS RESULTS 
To test the relationship between the RFI scores and patient outcomes, we used the HEDIS Comprehensive 
Diabetes Care indicators as the outcome measures. We regressed each of the HEDIS indicators for calendar 
years 2001 and 2002, and the change in results between the two years, on the aggregate 2002 RFI structure and 
process scores (covering calendar year 2001) using OLS regression. Both years were assessed since there is 
likely a lag between the delivery of DM services and their effect on patient outcomes. Within the models, we 
hypothesized that there would be a positive and significant association between the RFI scores and the HEDIS 
results. 
 
The results of these regressions are summarized in Table 4. Rather than report the coefficient estimates 
themselves, we report the estimated effect of a 10-point difference in the RFI score on the HEDIS indicator 
results, the adjusted R
2
value, and the significance of the estimated effects. There are three key findings from 
these results. First, more than half of the regressions resulted in insignificant coefficients, indicating that the 
estimated effect is not statistically different from zero, implying the absence of a relationship. Second, even 
among the significant models, the effects are very small. For example, in the 2002 Monitoring Nephropathy 
indicator, while the effect was statistically significant, a 10-point increase in the RFI process score equates to 
just a 1.71 percentage point increase in the HEDIS result. Finally, the adjusted R2 values ranged from .0652 to 
0.12, indicating that the combined scores explain very little variance in the HEDIS results within the sample. 
While the results are not reported in this article, we also employed logistic regression to test the ability of the 
RFI scores to predict the probability of a plan being in either the top or bottom quartile (nationally) of the 
HEDIS results in calendar years 2001 and 2002. Our findings were similar to the OLS models, namely, a high 
percentage of insignificant coefficients, and low effect sizes in the models with significant results. Finally, we 
also regressed the HEDIS measures on the individual structure and process component scores listed in Table 2, 
using multivariate OLS and logistic models. The findings failed to reveal a consistent relationship between any 
of the individual component scores and the HEDIS measures. 
 
Taken together, our regression analyses suggest that there is not a strong or consistent relationship between the 
HEDIS results and the RFI scores either at a point in time or when considering changes over time. Because of 
limitations in degrees of freedom, our models might not have been able to detect the effect if there was a small 
or modest correlation. It is also possible that the effect varied by types of plans or market characteristics, and 
since we were not able to control for these other possibly important covariates because of degrees of freedom 
constraints, we cannot rule this out. Still, if there was a very strong correlation between the two, whether 
positive or negative, our simple regressions would show significance. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis of the National Business Coalition on Health’s eValue8 RFI data suggests there is significant 
variation in managed care organization– sponsored diabetes DM programs, both within the individual program 
components and in the degree to which the managed care organizations are able to effectively structure the 
components into viable programs. Despite this variation however, the structural and process scores from the 
RFI were not substantively related to the HEDIS measures that are currently being used to assess health plan 
diabetes care performance. This begs the question of why there is not an observed relationship between DM 
program structure/process and chronic care outcomes and what implications the absence of such a relationship 
has for the development of P4P programs and the stakeholders of these programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
In many respects, the absence of a relationship between the eValue8 RFI and the HEDIS diabetes results is not 
surprising given the challenge of using a survey tool to systematically assess the structure and process of DM 
programs. There are practical limitations on both the number and scope of questions that can be included in the 
RFI, making it difficult to cover each component of the DM model in sufficient detail to render the results 
scientifically valid. A significant reason for the limitation pertains to the ability to make distinctions based on 
the content, breadth, or the effectiveness of program implementation. For example, member interventions were 
scored as binary ―yes‖ or ―no‖ events, rendering mediocre and excellent interventions as equivalent in the 
eValue8 scoring system. Decisions regarding the assignment of weights to various components of DM 
programs, while necessary for a scoring system, can also serve to generate arbitrary variation in the overall 
assessment of DM programs. Finally, despite the fact that the RFI includes a data auditing function, our analysis 
also found concerns with the quality of voluntary self-reported data submission in the form of missing or 
implausible data. 
 
Regarding the issue of who should be held accountable (and incentivized) for chronic care outcomes, this 
analysis raises more questions than answers. The conceptual framework noted in Figure 1 makes it clear that 
optimal management of persons with chronic conditions is a complex process requiring significant 
infrastructure. While health plans are likely to have more resources to devote to infrastructure than physician 
groups, plans also have a more difficult task in terms of coordinating this process among multiple independent 
physicians and physician groups. 
 
While there is evidence that health plan–sponsored DM programs can be effective at improving patient 
outcomes (Fireman, Bartlett, and Selby 2004; Villagra and Ahmed 2004), DM has been described as a ―red pill‖ 
that seems to work, but the ingredients are uncertain (Shojania and Grimshaw 2005). Quite simply, while there 
is strong belief that the Chronic Care Model and DM are effective for improving chronic illness care, there is 
little evidence about the most influential or important components that lead to improved chronic care outcomes 
(Villagra 2004) and little evidence regarding which stakeholders should assume responsibility for implementing 
the various components of DM. This fact, coupled with the documented variance in DM program design, as 
well as the increasing prevalence of P4P programs, suggests the need for carefully designed data collection and 
research that demonstrates the effectiveness of DM program components so as to provide physicians, health 
plans, and purchasers with the information necessary to improve chronic care delivery and to achieve P4P 
program objectives. 
 
Because many factors can influence chronic care outcomes, not the least of which is patient self-management 
and patient compliance, there is good reason in theory to measure the effectiveness of DM structure and process 
rather than outcomes. In practice, however, the complexity of measuring DM structure and process, and the lack 
of empirical evidence regarding the optimal characteristics of these structures and processes, suggests that 
standardized intermediate outcome and process measures such as those captured by HEDIS are probably the 
best targets for P4P programs, regardless of the entity being held accountable. Nonetheless, the eValue8 RFI 
provides a starting point for thinking about how to advance the concept of a broad measure of DM program 
quality to the point where it is possible that DM structure and process measures might replace or augment the 
measures that are currently being used in P4P programs. 
 
There are two important limitations of our study. First, the RFI sample was not randomly selected, and 
therefore, results from our analyses are not generalizable to the entire population of managed care 
organizations. Second, even though our data represent the largest sample of health plan–sponsored DM 
programs that we are aware of, it is small enough that it does not provide much statistical power to determine 
effect sizes. 
 
While the prevalence of health plan–sponsored DM programs has grown substantially since the late 1990s and 
appears to be yielding positive clinical results, it is still uncertain if DM has been successful in reducing health 
costs. The emergence of P4P programs incentivizing physicians provides another alternative strategy for 
improving chronic care delivery. It is reasonable to postulate that P4P programs have the potential to motivate 
either health plans or physicians to take more active roles in chronic care management. Both approaches have 
strengths and weaknesses, and it is likely that both will emerge as viable alternatives, at least until more 
definitive evidence becomes available to distinguish the most effective manner for encouraging improvements 
in the care of chronically ill patients. 
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